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Hesperus and Phosphorus: Sense, Pretense, and 
Reference 
Mark Crimmins 
In "On Sense and Reference," surrounding his discussion of how 
we describe what people say and think, identity is Frege's first stop 
and his last. We will follow Frege's plan here, but we will stop also 
in the land of make-believe. 
Identity challenges reflection, says Frege. By identity Frege in-
tends whatever it is we attribute when we say, for instance, that 
Hesperus is the same thing as Phosphorus. It can seem odd, he says, 
to think of identity as a relation between things, for, what interest 
could attach to a thing's being itself. It is odd, too, to think of 
identity as the relation that holds between different names of a 
thing, for then the statement that Hesperus is Phosphorus would 
be held to concern neither Hesperus nor Phosphorus, but only 
the name 'Hesperus' and the name 'Phosphorus' (and this would 
alienate the identity statement from such apparent kin as the state-
ment that Hesperus is the same size as Phosphorus). Frege's reso-
lution of the dilemma is well known: intermediate between a name 
and the thing named is a mode of presentation of the thing; the name 
expresses that way of thinking about the thing. A true identity state-
ment like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is not trivial because the entity 
that in the statement is said to be identical to itself is conceived 
differently under the two names: the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phos-
phorus' express different modes of presentation of a single object. 
Russell, too, finds his reflection challenged by identity. In "The 
Philosophy of Logical Atomism" he writes: 
Identity is a rather puzzling thing at first sight. When you say 'Scott is 
the author of Waverly', you are half-tempted to think there are two 
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people, one of whom is Scott and the other the author of Waverly, and 
they happen to be the same. That is obviously absurd, but that is the 
sort of way one is always tempted to deal with identity. 1 
Russell instead deals with identity by holding that nontrivial, true 
identity statements like 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' do not attribute 
relations at all. Rather, they assert complex claims about what sorts 
of things exist: for instance, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' might assert 
that there exists a thing that is both the first star visible in the 
evening sky (in one season) and the last star visible in the morning 
sky (in another season). 
I want to underline, however, Russell's phenomenological con-
fession: when we say 'Scott is the author of Waverly', we are half-
tempted to see what we are doing as stating of two things (Scott 
and the author of Waverly), that these two things 'happen to be 
the same'. Russell is right about the semantic phenomenology. At 
least, it is like that for me, too, and even more strongly in other 
cases (Hesperus and Phosphorus, Superman and Clark, the child 
and the adult). I agree, as well, that it would be absurd to think 
that we seriously mean to be claiming of two things that they are 
the same thing. This peculiar feeling of talking about two things 
cannot reveal what we are seriously doing. But before we dismiss 
this peculiar feeling, perhaps we should consider whether it is clear 
that in making a serious identity statement, everything we do is 
done seriously. 
1. Make-Believe and Truth 
Statements (and more generally uses of sentences) that rely on 
make-believe can be used to express genuine claims, and can be 
candidates for genuine truth and falsehood. Let me support this 
with an example in which the role of make-believe is more blatant. 
Suppose that I am trying to describe to you Ann's cleverness and 
modesty, and that I cannot find words to express neatly and per-
spicuously just the traits I want to characterize. I might compare 
her to some of our mutual acquaintances. I might, that is, say: 
(I) Ann is as clever as X and more modest than Y 
1 The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1985), 
115. 
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But let us suppose that none of our mutual acquaintances will do. 
The traits I have in mind, however, are related in a relatively direct 
way to traits that Conan Doyle portrays his characters as having. So 
I might say: 
(2) The degree of cleverness and the degree of modesty that 
actually are such that in the Sherlock Holmes stories there 
is portrayed there being a person named 'Holmes' with that 
degree of cleverness and there being a person named 'Wat-
son' with that degree of modesty, are such that Ann's degree 
of cleverness is comparable to the former, and her degree 
of modesty is greater than the latter. 
While perspicuous, that takes a long time to say, it is not easy to 
follow, and one needs considerable conceptual sophistication to 
formulate or to understand it. What I actually say, of course, is: 
(3) Ann is as clever as Holmes and more modest than Watson. 
In saying this I am not really comparing Ann to two other peo-
ple. But it is important to see that I am making as if to do exactly 
that. My use of the sentence (3) is framed from within a shallow 
pretense: a shared, conspiratorial make-believe that we can refer 
with the names 'Holmes' and 'Watson' to people who are as de-
scribed in Conan Doyle's stories. It is this pretense that explains 
my choice of these words in this particular arrangement. Sentence 
(3) is a sentence for comparing a person to two other people, and, 
viewed from inside the context of our shallow pretense, the sen-
tence indeed expresses a comparison of Ann to two other people. 
Certainly, the kind of "making as if' this exemplifies is not the 
sort of pretense that draws us into imaginative play; that is why I 
call it a shallow pretense. But it is nonetheless a form of pretense: 
to understand me, you have to see that I intend my utterance to 
be as if a statement comparing Ann to two other people, and only 
as if that. You have, that is, to distinguish what's so from what's 
pretend-so. 
The point of pretending, shallowly, with you that I am saying 
something about three people is that, in so doing, I genuinely say 
what I would have said in the laborious (2). The crucial distinction 
is between the sort of claim I make as if to express (I make as if 
to express a claim about three people), and the sort of claim I 
genuinely, seriously express (I genuinely express a claim about just 
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one person, namely Ann). I speak within the pretense, pretendedly 
about the world as we pretend it to be. But I also speak through the 
pretense, about the world as it really is. Somehow, the context of 
pretending allows me to generate with a pretend assertion of one 
sort of claim a genuine, serious assertion of a different sort of 
claim. 
But how does this work? What is the connection between what 
goes on within the pretense and what is really, seriously going on? 
Answering that question satisfactorily means confronting a web 
of issues about the nature of assertion and content. But until we 
have made a bit of headway in our main tack (we are headed, I 
remind you, to a consideration of statements about what people 
think and say), the relevant subtleties are likely to seem more sub-
tle than relevant. 
Let's focus on the question of the truth condition of my utter-
ance-that is, on the question what the world really must be like 
if my utterance is in fact to be a true utterance.2 The answer I favor 
will require elaboration, but it is straightforward: the utterance is 
really tr.ue just in case it is true within the pretense. In elaborating 
this, I will borrow heavily from Kendall Walton's work on make-
believe.3 
Ifwe make believe as I am inviting us to with statement (3), then 
we are making believe that with 'Holmes' and 'Watson' I can refer 
to persons with certain levels of cleverness and modesty. So within 
the pretense, what it takes for (3) to be true is that Ann's cleverness 
approximate Holmes's and that her modesty exceed Watson's. 
Thus, for the statement to be correctly attributed truth within the 
pretense (for it to be fictionally true), what must really be the case 
is that Ann's cleverness and modesty compare suitably to what is 
2Speaking of the truth condition of an utterance is in general dangerous, 
since one needs to decide to hold fixed certain features of the utterance 
in order to ask what more is needed if it is to be a true utterance. To see 
this, notice that what's wrong with the following view is not falsity: every 
utterance has the same truth condition: that the utterance be a true one. 
It is only when certain aspects of the utterance are held fixed (perhaps 
including its syntax and some "lexical" features of the constituent expres-
sions, contextual facts and speaker intentions), that a more specific truth 
condition can be isolated. But for the moment let's go with the flow. 
3 Mimesis as Make-Believe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 
and "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe," European journal of Phi-
losophy 1 (1993): 39-56. 
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attributed to the characters of Conan Doyle's stories. That is to say, 
(2) specifies the condition of the fictional truth of (3). And this 
condition, I propose, is also the genuine truth condition of (3), 
the condition that must be met if my utterance is to be seriously 
true. 
To lay this out a bit more systematically, I need to develop a 
distinction between two ways in which propositions can come to 
be fictionally true: propositions can be expressly made-believe, or their 
being fictionally true can be generated from reality. 4 If we expressly 
make believe that a certain hill is Mount Olympus and that you 
and I are the gods, then those propositions are directly forced to 
be fictionally true; they are in a sense stipulative, foundational 
truths of the make-believe. But consider the proposition that a god 
soon will tumble down the mountain. In our context, this propo-
sition might well be fictionally true, because you or I might well 
soon tumble; so, if you say 'a god soon will tumble down the moun-
tain', you might turn out to have spoken fictionally truly. In this 
case, whether it is fictionally true that a god will tumble depends 
not only on what we are expressly making believe, but also on 
whethe.r one of us in fact will soon tumble down the hill. Under-
standing our make-believe involves not only grasping what facts are 
expressly made-believe to obtain, but also grasping how further 
pretend-facts are generated from anticipated or unanticipated real 
facts. As Walton puts it, the principks of generation governing our 
make-believe determine how real facts and fictionally true propo-
sitions generate further fictionally true propositions. In this ex-
ample, we might naturally and spontaneously adopt principles of 
generation according to which actual tumbles down the hill gen-
erate fictional truths about tumbles down the mountain. The im-
portant point here is that the fictional truth of some claims de-
pends not only on the imposed parameters of the make-believe 
(which include the claims that are expressly made-believe and the 
principles of generation), but also on real-world facts that are in 
no sense constitutive of the make-believe. I think that statement 
(3) is such a claim, and that it is made precisely to express a serious 
4Walton's distinction between directly and indirectly generated (or pri-
mary and implied), fictionally true propositions seems to cross-cut this one. 
See Mimesis as Make-Believe, 140-44. 
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commitment to the real world's being such as to make the state-
ment fictionally true. 
Here, then, is what I take to be going on in (3): 
• There is a transient context of make-believe, in which certain 
propositions are expressly made-believe; for instance: that 
there are two persons to whom we can refer with the names 
'Holmes' and 'Watson', that the former was a brilliant detec-
tive, and that the latter was his faithful sidekick. 
• The fictional truth of certain other propositions is generated 
from reality. That is to say, these propositions are fictionally 
true in consequence of various real-world facts and of the pa-
rameters of the make-believe. Among the fictionally true prop-
ositions, depending on whether Ann indeed is sufficiently clev-
er and modest, might be the proposition that Ann is as clever 
as the detective we can refer to as 'Holmes' and more modest 
than the physician we can refer to as 'Watson'.5 
• It is fictionally true that I have expressed a proposition with 
my utterance of (3)-more particularly, it is fictionally true that 
there are people to whom we can refer as 'Holmes' and as 
'Watson' such that I have asserted the proposition that Ann is 
as clever as the former and more modest than the latter. Note 
that since there really are no such people, there really is no 
such proposition; however, since it is fictionally true that there 
are such people, it is fictionally true that there is such a prop-
osition. 
• Given the parameters of the make-believe, for it to be fiction-
ally true that the proposition I have expressed with (3) is true, 
is for (2) to be true. In short, (2) expresses the fictional-truth 
condition of my utterance. 
• For my utterance to be genuinely, seriously true it is necessary 
and sufficient that it be fictionally true. Thus, (2) expresses the 
truth condition of my utterance. 6 
5Why mention these metalinguistic propositions rather than, say, 'the 
proposition that Ann is as clever as Holmes and more modest than Wat-
son'? Since 'Holmes' and 'Watson' do not really refer to anything, I do 
not assume that there is any such proposition. Indeed I think that there is 
no such proposition, and so that there is no such proposition that can be 
even fictionally true. In explaining what is fictionally so, I want to identify 
propositions that are fictionally true, and so of course I restrict myself to 
all the propositions that there are. 
6 It is compatible with this account that there is a "fictionally operator" 
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This account of (3) involves a postulation of semantic pretense. 
This puts it in league with quite a few other semantic accounts, 
including for example certain theories of metaphor and of talk 
apparently about numbers. Accounts that postulate semantic pre-
tense break in two the semantic explanation of a statement. First, 
we explain the semantic properties (such as the logical form, truth 
conditions, and modal content) of the sort of statement the speak-
er makes as if to make, and second, we explain how the facts about 
the pretense fix the genuine semantic properties of the serious 
statement. 
The point of postulating semantic pretense is to answer the ques-
tion, what is a sentence like that doing in a speech act like this? 
We start with strong opinions about the serious semantic properties 
of the speech act and strong opinions about the semantic prop-
erties for which the sentence is really suited, but these opinions 
clash: the sentence doesn't seem suited to expressing what it ac-
tually is used to express. 
Part of postulating semantic pretense is to claim that the appar-
ent structure of a sentence is misleading as to the claims made in 
uses of it. But we do not simply claim this; we explain the use of 
that sentence by its being structurally suited to perform a certain 
task within a pretense, and we explain how its performance of that 
task suits it for use in genuinely expressing what it otherwise has 
no business expressing. The aim is to provide satisfying accounts 
both of what we say and of how we can manage to say it like that. 
Semantic pretense might find use in a language for any number 
of reasons. A key one is to let us express using ready, tidy linguistic 
resources claims that, perspicuously stated, would require cumber-
some formulations or unfamiliar terminology. 
Semantic pretense involves a special path from the semantic 
governing the statement, but I don't see any point in postulating hidden 
syntax in this sort of case. I prefer to see this statement as employing a 
trope, akin to metaphor, characterized by a distinctive path connecting 
utterances to their truth conditions. 
It perhaps is preferable to view this case not as involving a pretend (and 
also serious) assertion, but as involving two pretend (and also serious) pred-
ication.r-namely, of 'is as clever as Holmes' and of 'is more modest than 
Watson'. We then would inquire after the (fictional and serious) conditions 
of applicability, analogously to how we have sought truth conditions. There 
is no reason to restrict this sort of analysis to entire speech acts, nor even 
to utterances of whole sentences. 
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properties of words to the semantic properties of utterances. In 
that sense it is a kind of figure of speech, and I expect that some 
philosophers would prefer to say that in such cases the notions of 
genuine saying and of utterance truth are out of place. These phi-
losophers would hold that statement (3) could be true only if the 
names 'Holmes' and 'Watson' really referred. But, for one thing, 
ordinary intuitions about truth and saying are on my side: I have 
said that Ann is very clever and modest, and, supposing she is, my 
utterance is true. Moreover, the behavior of the sentence (3) when 
embedded in larger sentences (for instance, in a denial or as the 
antecedent of a conditional) shows that we linguistically treat this 
use of the sentence as a genuinely expressive use. Certainly there 
is a legitimate notion of a statement's perspicuously portraying a 
state of affairs, on which (3) does not perspicuously portray the 
state of affairs that I take it actually to portray. But it would be 
unfortunate to assume that every genuine linguistic portrayal of a 
state of affairs must be a perspicuous portrayal. Obviously, one can 
opt for a narrow concept of utterance truth by staunchly refusing 
to adm.it truth of all but perspicuous sayings. The only complaint 
against that concept of utterance truth is its irrelevance. The nar-
row concept of utterance truth does not in general capture the 
kind of utterance correctness that we normally use 'true' to mark, 
and it does not track the features of utterances that are central in 
their status as assertions, denials, and so on. I will adopt here the 
ordinary concept of utterance truth that allows imperspicuous say-
ings such as (3) to be true, and I hope that what follows will con-
stitue a partial defense of the utility of this concept. 
2. Back to Hesperus and Phosphorus 
Let's assume for now that Frege is correct in taking the names 
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' to somehow signal distinct ways of 
thinking of Venus. I am not asking you to assume that there are 
abstract entities suited to being called modes of presentation, nor 
to assume that ways of thinking have any particular connection to 
descriptions or features of the object thought about, nor that those 
who share a mode of presentation are in any intuitive sense cog-
nitively similar, nor that a way of thinking is what a competent user 
of a name grasps. Indeed, all I ask you to assume with me is that 
we in fact use the names to effect some way of classifying actual and 
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possible thoughts about Venus, some as "Hesperus thoughts," and 
others as "Phosphorus thoughts." The classification may be ob-
scure, artificial, vague, and certainly it may vary from context to 
context, but I will assume that in fact we do make such a classifi-
cation. I hope that this is uncontroversial. I will speak of Hesperus 
and Phosphorus thoughts as involving "the Hesperus-mode (of 
presentation)" and "the Phosphorus-mode," which unfortunately 
gives the impression that modes of presentation are assumed to be 
constituents of thoughts, but I want to be understood simply as 
meaning that the thoughts are on one side or the other of the 
distinction that we in fact use the names to signal. Given this, it is 
trivially true that the thoughts we classify as "Hesperus thoughts" 
all involve exactly the same mode of presentation-but of course 
it is open to us (and indeed it is plausible) to hold that this single 
mode of presentation encompasses very different cases. After plac-
ing more cards on the table, I will return briefly to questions about 
how classifications of thoughts by modes of presentation might be 
explained. But in this paper I am primarily concerned not with 
what distinctions we make among thoughts when we distinguish by 
ways of thinking, but rather with how the language that we use to 
report those distinctions manages to do that. 
I am going to explore the idea that our talk about what people 
say or think often involves semantic pretense. As a way of sneaking 
up on that idea I propose first simply to plant a pretense in order 
to examine its fruit. 
Let's make believe that Hesperus and Phosphorus are two 
things, that thinking of a thing using the Hesperus-mode consti-
tutes thinking of one of them, and that thinking of a thing using 
the Phosphorus-mode constitutes thinking of the other. Thus, we 
are making believe different things about the thoughts we in fact 
classify as "Hesperus thoughts" and as "Phosphorus thoughts." 
This make-believe is best described by giving its principles of gen-
eration: 
( 4) It is fictionally true that there are two things to which we 
can refer as "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus"; when and only 
when a thought involves the Hesperus-mode, it is fictionally 
true that the thought concerns the one thing, and when and 
only when a thought involves the Phosphorus-mode, it is 
fictionally true that the thought concerns the other thing. 
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Real facts about people thinking of Venus in the two different ways 
make it fictionally true that they are thinking of two different 
things. Thoughts are correctly classified within the pretense as be-
ing "about Hesperus" just when they in fact involve the Hesperus-
mode, and they are correctly classified as "about Phosphorus" just 
when they in fact involve the Phosphorus-mode. In a sense, we are 
pretending-apart Venus, by pretending of two kinds of thoughts 
about it that they are thoughts about different things. 
This leaves a great deal open: which features of Venus are we to 
make believe that the pretended two things possess-just how are 
we to pretend-apart all that we believe about Venus? Suppose for 
the moment that, apart from what I have already laid down, I don't 
say; suppose that I leave our make-believe in this extremely frag-
mentary state. Remember, I am not suggesting guidelines for imag-
inative play here, but only establishing a shallow pretense for se-
mantic purposes; we are instituting a manner of speaking, not 
painting a fantasy world. As I will clarify, we should think of the 
pretense as a license for representing distinctions about modes of 
presentatipn as distinctions among the objects presented. 
Having imposed the shallow pretense, I want to show how to 
exploit it as a tool in saying things. I want to show that there are 
various claims about the real person Hammurabi that our pretense 
makes much easier to state, since, given what we are now making 
believe, we can simply report how Hammurabi is related to the 
things Hesperus and Phosphorus. 
Let's start with: 
(5) Hesperus is visible in the evening, and Hammurabi correctly 
attributed this feature to it. 
There is a strong intuition about the semantic structure of this state-
ment that might be expressed as follows: Hammurabi is said here 
to attribute a certain feature to a certain thing, his way of thinking 
of the thing is not brought into play. This is what the sentence feels 
like, semantically; it does not feel as though there are modes of 
presentation mentioned explicitly, nor even brought in by ellipsis 
or by tacit proviso. In the tradition of philosophical semantics, this 
would be deemed a paradigmatically de re belief sentence: designed 
for relating Hammurabi to Hesperus without entailing anything 
special about how he thinks of the thing. I call statements of that 
kind notionally open-they classify the agent's thought by reference 
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only, and leave open the question how the agent thinks of the 
thing. 
Accordingly, in the context of our make-believe, let's regard (5) 
as entirely notionally open: as expressing a claim simply about how 
Hammurabi is related to a particular object, namely the one we 
call "Hesperus," without mention of modes of presentation. But 
remember that, given what we are pretending, it is fictionally true 
that someone has a belief about the thing we call "Hesperus" ex-
actly when they really have a belief involving the Hesperus-mode. 
So this statement is fictionally true just in case Hammurabi in re-
a!lty had a belief attributing evening visibility to a thing, in which 
belief he employed the Hesperus-mode. I will adopt a semi-formal 
notation that lets me express such claims without horrible awk-
wardness. Where mH is the mode of presentation in question, the 
fictional truth turns on the claim diagrammed in (6): 
(6) Hammurabi believed: [mH] is visible in the evening. 
This bracket notation is a cognitive twist on the sort of concate-
nated use-and-mention quotation used in: 
(7) Chip says that we are "politically correct." 
In (6), we are using the bracket notation in a formula that, in 
describing a belief, partly describes what is allegedly believed to be 
so, and also describes the agent's alleged way of thinking of the 
subject matter of the belief. The formula (6) portrays a state of 
affairs that obtains just in case Hammurabi had a belief ascribing 
evening visibility, and this belief involved the mode of presentation 
mH in the "subject-position." (It does not entail that Hammurabi's 
belief is about the mode of presentation.) At the cost of a more 
complex notation, this state of affairs can be diagrammed more 
perspicuously: 7 
mH 
,1. 
(8) Hammurabi's belief: ((evening-visible, ???)) 
The point I want to dwell on is that (6), which is the (nonfictional) 
condition for the fictional truth of (5) is what we might call "Fre-
7See my Talk About Beliefs, chapter 4. The need for complexity in a 
perspicuous notation is an important motivation for semantic pretense. 
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gean" or de dicto, or, to choose a term with less baggage, notionally 
loaded-it characterizes Hammurabi's belief by mode of presenta-
tion. This shows that by situating ourselves within a shallow pre-
tense, we can exploit a sentence that is intrinsically notionally open 
to characterize beliefs in a notionally loaded way, at least in the 
sense that the condition of the statement's fictional truth is a no-
tionally loaded condition. But I ask you to treat the utterance not 
merely as a pretend-statement, but also as a genuine, serious state-
ment-one that, like our earlier example about Holmes and Wat-
son, has as its genuine truth condition the condition of its fictional 
truth. Voila: a notionally open sentence determines a notionally 
loaded truth condition. (More revealingly, a notionally open truth 
condition within the pretense generates a notionally loaded serious 
truth condition.) 
This strategy pays off too in: 
(9) Hesperus, but not Phosphorus, was thought by Hammurabi 
to be visible in the evening. 
Supposing that the statement, viewed from within the pretense, is 
notionally open (and once again that is how the sentence struc-
turally feels) ,8 it is fictionally true just in case Hammurabi attributed 
evening visibility to a thing under the Hesperus-mode, but not un-
der the Phosphorus-mode. The condition of fictional truth, then, 
and hence the genuine truth condition, is the proposition given 
in (10): 
(10) Hammurabi believed: [mH] is visible in the evening, but 
Hammurabi did not believe: [mp] is visible in the evening. 
Once again, our simple make-believe bends an intrinsically notion-
ally open sentence to notionally loaded purposes. 
Many philosophers have followed Frege in holding that sentenc-
es like 
( 11) Hammurabi believed that Hesperus was brighter than 
Phosphorus 
8The reader may feel, too, that this sentence would naturally be used 
in making a notionally loaded claim. I agree, and what I hope to make 
clear is just how this sentence can do that. But the first step is to notice 
how the intuition about what the sentence can be used to claim conflicts 
with an intuition about how it is semantically structured. I will show how 
to reconcile these intuitions. 
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are, in virtue of the semantic conventions of our language, 
equipped for ascribing modes of presentation-they are intrinsi-
cally notionally loaded sentences. Others have insisted that, despite 
appearances, such sentences express claims that are entirely no-
tionally open. Now, our make-believe has set up a middle ground. 
Suppose we consider ( 11) to be intrinsically notionally open, and 
suppose I use it within our pretense, in order to make a serious 
statement. Then, just as before, the pretend-statement is notionally 
open, but the requirement for its fictional truth-and hence its 
serious truth condition-is notionally loaded. The statement is 
genuinely true just in case Hammurabi believed of a thing thought 
of under the Hesperus-mode that it was brighter than a thing 
thought of under the Phosphorus-mode-that is, just in case: 
(12) Hammurabi believed: [mH] is brighter than [mp]. 
3. The Pretense Account 
Maybe the manner in which our stipulated make-believe has en-
abled these notionally loaded claims is revealing of how ordinary 
notionally loaded attitude talk really works. Maybe, that is to say, 
attitude-ascribing sentences really are intrinsically notionally open, 
and yet standard utterances of them have notionally loaded truth 
conditions, owing to our standard use of something relevantly like 
the pretense I have suggested. This is the "pretense account" that 
I want to pursue. There will be obstacles. We need, for one thing, 
to address the issue of what modal contents are expressed by attitude 
reports (as contrasted with their truth conditions); and we need 
to confront a variety of other interesting issues and examples. 
But the obstacle that must first be addressed is stark implausi-
bility. For one thing, the pretense account about attitude reports 
may seem theoretically far-fetched-attitude reports, after all, form 
a large, important, and relentlessly scrutinized class of serious state-
ments, and the pretense account has at the very least not often 
struck theorists as an obvious line of explanation. To be sure, there 
are many partly related ideas in the literature: Quine deems atti-
tude reporting a "dramatic idiom," several philosophers treat the 
talk as describing unreal notional or belief "worlds" or "theories," 
and cognitive simulation theorists have suggested that reporting 
another's attitudes is really a matter of voicing the attitudes one 
13 
MARK CRIMMINS 
takes on in simulating the other. Nonetheless, nothing very like 
the present hypothesis has gained currency.9 
More importantly, it would surprise and confuse an ordinary 
speaker to suggest that in discussing Hammurabi's beliefs about 
Venus, she herself is pretending that Hesperus and Phosphorus 
are two things rather than one. She might insist that she knows 
how to pretend that, and that she is quite sure that that is not what 
she is doing. Normally, we use notionally loaded attitude talk with-
out engaging in the kind of imaginative exercise that would be 
instigated by the instructions 'Let's pretend that Hesperus and 
Phosphorus are two things'. 
But the pretense account does not require this kind of imagi-
native pretense. I have said that all it requires is a shallow (limited, 
provisional) pretense that really amounts to the institution of a 
manner of speaking. Let me clarify what I think the pretense ac-
count should be committed to. According to the pretense account, 
in distinguishing thoughts by mode of presentation we talk as if 
we are distinguishing among the things thought about-we use our 
linguistic tools that are designed for specifying and distinguishing 
among the things thought about. In particular, when we are distin-
guishing among multiple modes of presentation of a single thing 
we standardly talk as if we are referring to different things (for 
example, Hesperus and Phosphorus). It seems to me that this 
much should be granted plausibility by every ordinary speaker. Ac-
cording to the pretense account, the way this sort of talk accom-
plishes the task is illuminated by an account in terms of principles 
of generation. This requires there being a distinction between what 
is as-if-so and what is really so. What is as-if-so needn't be what we 
are licensed to imagine (as in more familiar cases of pretense); for 
9 See W. V. 0. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge: MIT, 1960), esp. 219; 
Daniel Dennett, "Beyond Belief," in The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: 
MIT, 1987); Fran~ois Recanati, "Domains of Discourse," Linguistics and 
Philosophy 19 (1996): 445-75; Walter Edelberg, "Intentional Identity and 
the Attitudes," Linguistics and Philosophy 15 ( 1992): 561-96, and "A Per-
spectivalist Semantics for the Attitudes," Nous 29 (1995): 31~2; Robert 
Gordon, "Folk Psychology as Simulation," Mind and Language 1 (1986): 
158-71; Alan Leslie, "Some Implications of Pretense for Mechanisms Un-
derlying the Child's Theory of Mind," in Developing Theories of Mind, ed.J. 
Astington, P. Harris, and D. Olson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 19-46. See also Fred Landman, Towards a Theory of Information 
(Dordrecht: Foris, 1986). 
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the correctness of the pretense account, it need only be that what 
is as-if-so governs what is correct to say when we are speaking as if 
we are referring to different things. If we do quite standardly talk 
as if we are linguistically manipulating things when really we are 
manipulating modes of presentation, and if the pretense account 
gives a plausible story about how thing-language manages to do 
this work, then it matters not at all that we do not ordinarily think 
of ourselves as pretending that Hesperus and Phosphorus are two 
things. 
S_o the objection from ordinary-speaker-bafflement can be met 
by distinguishing, in the class of pretendings, shallow speaking-as-
if from imaginative play. Nothing depends on whether the word 
'pretense' is appropriate to speaking-as-if. The important commit-
ments of the pretense account are that in ordinary notionally load-
ed talk there is a distinction between what is as-if-so and what is 
so, and that the principles of generation proposed by the account 
are correct. 
That the pretense account has not emerged as a contender 
among theorists (which anyway is not a great objection), can be 
explained by too much focus on the compositional model on 
which what a sentence is used to say is built up largely from the 
meanings of its components. The mechanism of semantic pretense 
(which surely is sufficiently systematic as not to raise special worries 
about how finite minds can grasp it) allows dramatic shifts from 
component-meanings to serious statement-content. 
Thus, we should be careful not to overstate the degree of im-
mediate implausibility we face here. There are also several consid-
erations boosting the pretense account's plausibility. Principally, 
the account manages to answer nicely to key truth-conditional and 
phenomenological intuitions, as might best be seen in contrast 
with the Russellian and Fregean accounts of attitude statements. 
Synthesizing Russellianism and Fregeanism 
The Russellian account10 has it that all attitude reports are notion-
ally open. To say that Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is bright-
10See for instance Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle (Cambridge: MIT, 
1986), and Scott Soames, "Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and 
Semantic Content," Philowphical TffjJics 15 (1987): 44-87. 
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er than Phosphorus is not to require anything whatever of the 
modes of presentation Hammurabi employs in the attributed be-
lief. He simply must believe of the thing Hesperus (and how he 
thinks of that thing is irrelevant), that it is brighter than the thing 
Phosphorus (and, again, how he thinks of that thing is irrelevant). 
Famously, this has implausible consequences: if Hammurabi be-
lieves that Hesperus is brighter than Phosphorus, then he neces-
sarily also believes that Phosphorus is brighter than Hesperus (and, 
even, that Hesperus is brighter than Hesperus). This has led to 
the stigmatization of Russellianism as a view that sacrifices all truth-
conditional plausibility to the dubious idol Logical Purity. But at-
tention to the bizarre inferences licensed by Russellianism obscures 
a deep source of plausibility for the account. When I say 'Ham-
murabi believes that Hesperus is brighter than Phosphorus', it feels 
like I am simply talking about Hammurabi, believing, Hesperus, 
brightness, and Phosphorus-it feels like I am simply portraying a 
state of affairs in which an individual (Hammurabi) believes that 
a thing (Hesperus) is brighter than a thing (Phosphorus). David-
son expresses a related point when he writes that if we could regain 
our pre-Fregean semantic innocence, we would find it incredible 
to think that names in that-clauses stand for anything different 
from what they stand for in other contexts. 11 That is surely right, 
but even more is true: when we focus on the phenomenology of 
attitude reporting, keeping at arm's length the truth-conditional 
intuitions informed by worries about substitutivity, it can seem that 
Russellianism has to be right, for what it feels like semantically is that 
there are no references to modes of presentation, utterances, syn-
tactic structures, or the like. Russellianism is truth-conditionally 
absurd, but it is the phenomenologically natural semantics for at-
titude sentences; we have to be led away from it by the substitution 
puzzles. 
Frege is led by those puzzles to postulate an interesting-to my 
mind too interesting-hypothesis about our language: in the con-
text of attitude sentences, he proposes, names stand for modes of 
presentation rather than for their bearers. The effect of this device 
is that I use the names in ( 11) to refer not to Hesperus and Phos-
phorus, but to the Hesperus-mode and the Phosphorus-mode. Put-
11 
"0n Saying That," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1984). 
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ting aside qualms about whether modes of presentation really are 
things to be referred to, I believe that Frege provides an apparatus 
that issues in rather plausible judgments about the truth conditions 
and logical properties of a wide class of attitude reports. We do use 
attitude sentences to ascribe modes of presentation, and Frege's 
proposed device would explain this neatly, were it not for a major 
problem. As Davidson remarks, it seems frankly incredible that our 
language actually employs such a device: when we use names in 
attitude ascriptions it feels like we are using them as names, and 
not as names of modes of presentation. Fregeanism accommodates 
notionally loaded truth conditions, but it is phenomenologically 
absurd. 
The pretense account we are exploring, it seems to me, keeps 
the good bits of both Russellianism and Fregeanism, while avoiding 
their worst problems. 
According to the pretense account, there really are notionally 
loaded uses of attitude ascriptions. In using an attitude ascription 
to attribute a mode of presentation, the speaker adopts a pretense 
that allows her to talk about thoughts involving that mode of pre-
sentati_on as if she were talking about thoughts about a distinctive 
object. So she uses language that is designed for talking about 
objects rather than about modes of presentation. 
On this account, it is no surprise that the phenomenology of 
using names in attitude sentences (just like the use of 'Holmes' in 
(3)) is that of using names to refer to things, since, within the 
pretense, this is exactly what the speaker is doing. Indeed, within 
the pretense, this is all that she is doing. The logical form of the 
pretend claim is entirely Russellian: the agent's belief is classified 
simply by what things it is about, and modes of presentation do 
not come into it. In one phenomenological respect the pretense 
account even has the advantage over Russellianism. Russellianism 
captures the feeling that the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', 
in (11), are simply used to refer. But, and this is related to Russell's 
observation about identity, even when one knows that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus, in using ( 11) one feels as though one is referring to 
different things with those names. The phenomenology of ( 11) is 
precisely that of expressing a state of affairs relating Hammurabi 
to two things. It feels like we are distinguishing Hesperus, and Ham-
murabi's attitudes about it, from Phosphorus, and Hammurabi's at-
titudes about it. Sober-minded philosophers with robust senses of 
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reality notice this, realize that it cannot be taken seriously, and 
decide, too hastily, that it cannot be taken at all. 
The pretense account allows essentially Fregean truth conditions 
for attitude ascriptions, and so it garners the plausibility that comes 
with that. But there is no need for the Fregean rule that names 
take on special sorts of referents in such contexts. As regards 
names, the pretense account gets by with the straightforward prin-
ciple that they are devices for talking about their bearers. We rec-
oncile these intuitions: that some attitude reports are notionally 
loaded, that the names in them function as names normally do, 
that the names are in some sense not treated as names of the same 
thing, and that the sentence wears its logical form on its sleeve-
there is no tacit or explicit component of the sentence that stands 
for a mode of presentation. 
De Re/De Dicto Unmarked 
Another merit of the account is that it allows a de re I de dicta 
distinction that is not syntactically marked. Most theorists who have 
expressed a view on the matter believe that many attitude reports 
are notionally open, and of course it is compatible with the pre-
tense account that sometimes attitude ascriptions are used inde-
pendently of any pretense and that they are in these cases notion-
ally open. For reasons that I will not pursue here, I am not con-
vinced that there are any ordinary notionally open reports. 12 How-
ever, even if I were convinced that there are lots of them, I would 
remain unconvinced that the distinction between notionally open 
and notionally loaded reports is syntactically marked. For I very 
much doubt that a report in which names "take wide scope" with 
respect to the attitude verb must be notionally open. Consider 
agam: 
(9) Hesperus, but not Phosphorus, was thought by Hammurabi 
to be visible in the evening. 
Here, the names take wide scope (meaning roughly that they are 
not logically contained in the attitude verb phrase), and yet the 
overwhelmingly natural interpretation of this statement is the no-
tionally loaded one. The idea that wide scope forces notional open-
12See my "Notional Specificity," Mind and Language 10 (1995): 464-77. 
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ness, it seems to me, comes from assuming that the question wheth-
er a statement is notionally loaded must be settled by the logical 
form of the sentence being used. But the pretense account shows 
that this assumption is dispensable. 
Empty Names No Worry 
The pretense account accounts particularly smoothly for the func-
tion of nonreferring names in attitude reports such as: 
(13) Elijah believes that Santa is overworked. 
Just as we talk as if there are distinctive objects corresponding to 
the Hesperus and Phosphorus concepts, we talk as if there is a 
distinctive object corresponding to the Santa-mode. Hence, the 
statement's truth requires that Elijah have an overwork-attributing 
belief involving that mode of presentation. We will see below how 
this dovetails with a nice account, due to Walton and Gareth Evans, 
of statements about existence and nonexistence. 
Birds of a Feather 
The pretense account suggests a tight connection between notion-
ally loaded propositional attitude reports and certain other state-
ments. J:l Consider first: 
( 14) Hammurabi was fond of Hesperus but not of Phosphorus. 
If we employ the pretense account exactly as before, then for this 
statement to be true is for Hammurabi in reality to direct fondness 
toward a thing thought of under the Hesperus-mode but not under 
the Phosphorus-mode. Evidently, objectual attitudes like fondness, 
fearing, and remembering present no new challenge to the pre-
tense account. Consider also: 
(15) It was Hesperus, not Phosphorus, that Hammurabi often 
saw in the evening sky. 
13There recently has been a flurry of interest in apparent failures of 
substitution in other than the "classic" propositional attitude contexts. See 
for instance Anne Bezuidenhout, "Pragmatics and Singular Reference," 
Mind and Language 11 (1996): 133-59; Jennifer Saul, "Substitution and 
Simple Sentences," Analysis 57 (1997): 102-8; Graeme Forbes, "How Much 
Substitutivity?" Analysis 57 (1997): 109-13. 
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(16) Hammurabi saw Hesperus more often than he saw Phos-
phorus. 
(17) Hammurabi's way was lit more often by Hesperus than by 
Phosphorus. 
Each of these sentences can be used naturally by a speaker aware 
of the identity, in each case the speaker would naturally take the 
truth of her utterance not to allow switching the names, and yet in 
each_ case it seems very awkward to hold that there are special 
opaque senses (for example, of 'lit by') or that names are func-
tioning other than as names of their bearers. It seems prima facie 
plausible that what is at work in these cases is at least approximately 
what is at work in notionally loaded attitude reports. And, inde-
pendently, it seems prima facie very plausible that in these cases 
we are making as if to refer to different things with the names 
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. This in itself is support for the pre-
tense account: it groups like with like. 
Here is how I would explain these statements. In these cases our 
make-beli_eve about the modes of presentation helps to generate 
further fictional truths about the pretended two objects. To square 
our make-believe with the fact that sightings of Venus in different 
situations are connected with the Hesperus-mode and the Phos-
phorus-mode, we make believe that, in certain situations, it is Hes-
perus and not Phosphorus that is seen (indeed, it is Hesperus and 
not Phosphorus that is there), and in others vice versa. Our make-
believe does not, of course, resolve all the questions one might 
have as to just how this is a coherent fiction. But for the purposes 
of the statements in question, it need not do so, so long as it is 
clear what to count, within the make-believe, as manifestations of 
Hesperus versus Phosphorus. And this is pretty clear: we count 
evening manifestations of Venus as manifestations of Hesperus, 
and morning manifestations as manifestations of Phosphorus. 
Thus, for instance, the truth condition of (16)-that is, the real-
world requirement for its fictional truth-is perhaps that Ham-
murabi saw Venus in the evening more often than he saw it in the 
morning. 
Suppose that Hammurabi wakens abruptly and is wrong about 
what time it is (and confused about what season it is). It might be 
correct (the pretense account predicts) to report, "Hammurabi 
believes that Hesperus is in the sky; but he is wrong-really it's 
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Phosphorus." This indeed seems a natural thing to say, and the 
pretense account shows how it is entirely compatible with holding 
that Hammurabi's belief is really true (its falsity being merely fic-
tional). 
No doubt, special features of the Hesperus/Phosphorus exam-
ple account for there being a natural way to pretend-apart mani-
festations of Hesperus and of Phosphorus. There is no similarly 
natural way to pretend-apart manifestations of Cicero and of Tully 
(except in the sense of pretending-apart cases of hearing about Cic-
ero and cases of hearing about Tully, as well, of course, as believing 
about Cicero versus Tully). Where such pretendings-apart are nat-
ural, the present account would predict, statements analogous to 
(15), (16), and (17) will be available. 
The Usual Case 
One respect in which the Hesperus/Phosphorus example is excep-
tional is that in it, distinctions about modes of presentation are 
undeniably live issues. Few deny that in the case of 'Hammurabi 
believed that Hesperus is brighter than Phosphorus', the speaker 
is at some communicative level or other distinguishing among 
(what might be called) modes of presentation. This is exceptional. 
In most ordinary attitude reports, modes of presentation seem to 
be the farthest things from our minds. If I say, 
(18) Buchanan thinks that Gingrich is a communist 
it is not nearly so obviously natural to regard me as talking about 
modes of presentation. 
It would be compatible with the pretense account to hold that 
the statement (18) is notionally open (for the account is an ac-
count only of notionally loaded statements). However, I am con-
vinced that the statement is in fact notionally loaded. If (18) were 
notionally open, then for its truth it would suffice that Buchanan 
recalled once seeing a man adrift in a pro-communist parade (who 
in fact was Gingrich, though Buchanan did not recognize him), 
and took him to be a communist. But surely that in fact does not 
suffice for the truth of my statement. For my statement to be true, 
Buchanan must attribute communism to Gingrich thinking of him, 
as we might put it, relevantly normally. Given the thin understand-
ing of a mode of presentation that we have been employing, we 
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can as well say that Buchanan must employ the relevantly normal 
mode of presentation of Gingrich (it is unimportant whether that 
strikes you as just the right characterization of how Buchanan must 
think of Gingrich so long as you grant that the report is notionally 
loaded). 
On the face of it, these two observations are in tension. Intuitive-
ly, modes of presentation are far from our minds in the statement, 
and yet what is claimed is notionally loaded. But there is a syn-
thesis: the possibility of other modes of presentation of Gingrich 
is truth-conditionally ignored in the statement. 
There are at least two senses in which a possibility might be said 
to be ignored in a statement. First, it might be presuppositionally 
ignored-it might be presupposed that the possibility is not actual; 
but this surely is not necessary here-nothing requires presuppos-
ing that Buchanan really has no irrelevant mode of presentation. 
The crucial sense in which a possibility can be ignored is that it 
can be truth-conditionally ignored-it can be tacitly settled that 
the possibility is not to be regarded as relevant to the truth of the 
statement. In a statement of 
(19) There is milk in the refrigerator 
the possibility that there is a dried drip of milk on the shelf might 
be ignored-it might be tacitly settled that this is not to be• counted 
a case of there being milk in the refrigerator despite its really being 
a case of there being milk in the refrigerator. I believe that this is 
aptly regarded as a form of pretense, since it is a (tacit) determi-
nation not to count as a P what really is a P (the proper explanation 
of such cases14 will advert to principles of generation). Returning 
to our example, in context it is clear that only thoughts involving 
the relevantly normal mode of presentation are to be counted thoughts 
about Gingrich. More precisely, we are engaging in a make-believe 
with the following principle of generation: 
(20) Thoughts involving the relevantly normal mode of presen-
tation of Gingrich (and only those) generate fictional 
truths that one is thinking about Gingrich. 
14Such cases are enormously common. See John Searle, "Literal Mean-
ing," in Expression and Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979). 
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The parallel with the pretense operative in the Hesperus/Phos-
phorus case is this: in both cases thoughts involving a certain mode 
of presentation (and only such thoughts) generate fictional truths 
that the thoughts concern a distinctive object. In the Hesperus/ 
Phosphorus case, this requires pretending Venus apart into two 
merely fictional objects; in the case of Gingrich, no pretending apart 
is required-Gingrich himself can serve within the pretense as the 
needed distinctive object. By ignoring other modes of presentation 
in this way, our talk simply of beliefs about Gingrich acquires no-
tionally loaded truth conditions. Like the pretense about milk in 
( 19), the pretense about thoughts about Gingrich normally doesn't 
draw notice until truth-conditional intuitions are canvassed. This 
resolves the observed tension and brings the usual case under the 
wing of the pretense account. 
It is absolutely essential to the plausibility of this application of 
the pretense account that we keep in mind the shallow nature of 
the claimed pretense. The claim is simply that we use one cate-
gorization of thoughts (being about Gingrich) to effect a different 
categorization (involving the normal mode of presentation of Gin-
grich). We talk as if we are discussing any thoughts about Gingrich 
whatsoever in order really to discuss only thoughts that involve the 
normal mode of presentation of him. The proposed principle of 
generation embodies that idea. 
If a pretense really plays this role in (18) then surely a similar 
pretense operates in just about every ordinary attitude report, for 
the puzzling tension we observed about that statement is rather 
the rule than the exception: modes of presentation are not often 
on our minds in attitude reporting, but it is usually counterintuitive 
to view reports as notionally open. In the unexceptional cases, 
some mode of presentation of the entity has an obvious claim to 
relevance; so it is plausible that, as in the Gingrich case, we quite 
standardly truth-conditionally ignore all but the obviously relevant 
mode of presentation of an entity. 15 In the exceptional cases, such 
15Given our thin conception of mode of presentation, remember, there 
is no distinction between specifying a single mode of presentation and 
specifying a type or class of modes of presentation. Considerations like 
those supporting the notional loadedness of the Gingrich case seem to me 
to support taking most ordinary reports to be notionally loaded as regards 
not only particulars (like Gingrich) but also universals (like being a com-
munist), but I ignore this in the present discussion. 
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as the Hesperus/Phosphorus case and many others familiar in the 
philosophical literature, it is still more plausible to postulate pre-
tenses involving modes of presentation, for modes of presentation 
are quite plausibly "in the air" in such statements, and the pre-
tense account offers an account (which I hope by now has begun 
to seem reasonably plausible) of how they enter into the truth 
conditions of the statements. 
Beginning at Horne 
If the pretense account is correct, then it seems that speaking 
about modes of presentation as if we were speaking about the ob-
jects presented is something that we do spontaneously and natu-
rally. But why should that be? Let me distinguish this question from 
an easier one. It is not surprising to find that our natural ways of 
thinking about the thoughts of others involve pretense in one form 
or another. It is certainly plausible-and recent work in philosophy 
and cognitive psychology has only made it more so-that we often 
make sense of others by figuring out how to see things their way. 
So it would come as no surprise that attitude reporting involves 
pretense in some way. But the pretense account postulates a spe-
cific sort of pretense that is not a matter of pretending to be some-
one else, or to be in their shoes. Why should it be natural to make 
as if one is distinguishing among objects when one is really distin-
guishing modes of presentation? 
There may be a deep explanation of the naturalness of this pre-
tense based on features of normal first-person access to one's at-
titudes. Consider how absurd it would be for Hammurabi, in 
thought, to self-ascribe attitudes in a way that makes the attributed 
modes of presentation explicit: 
(21) I believe that Hesperus, thought of under my Hesperus-
mode, is brighter than Phosphorus, thought of under my 
Phosphorus-mode. 
(22) When I see Hesperus tonight, I will imagine holding Hes-
perus, thought of under my Hesperus-mode, in my hand. 
The absurdity here is something beyond the mere awkwardness 
and terminological unfamiliarity of the third-person case. It has to 
do with the fact that the modes of presentation explicitly self-at-
tributed in these cases are already there, in that they are employed in 
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the ascriptions to represent the individuals that the attitudes are 
about. Normally, when one has reason to consider a self-ascription 
of an attitude about a thing, in the context of ascription one thinks 
of the thing using the very mode of presentation that one has 
reason to ascribe to oneself. 16 Thus, in the first-person case, the 
strategy of distinguishing among modes of presentation as if 
among objects presented is an utterly natural and elegant cognitive 
shorthand. 
A similar consideration extends to the third-person case to what-
ever extent it is typical that when we represent to ourselves which 
thing another's attitude is about, we represent it using the very 
mode of presentation we ascribe to the other. Perhaps that indeed 
is typical, but the question may be controversial. But even if it is 
not typical, the familiarity of the pretense strategy from the first-
person case might make it thoroughly natural in the third-person 
case as well (especially if third-person ascription in some way in-
volves simulated or proxy first-person ascription). It is important 
to see, in any case, that the pretense hypothesis is not obviated by 
a simulation account of third-person ascription, since it is needed 
even for understanding first-person ascriptions. 
4. Modes of Presentation 
The pretense account employs the notion of a mode of presenta-
tion, and nothing could be more important in assessing the ac-
count than determining the prospects for satisfying explanations 
of what modes of presentation are, and of the access to them that 
speakers and hearers rely on in producing and understanding at-
titude reports. 
I have little novel to say about these matters here. 17 The use to 
which modes of presentation are put in the pretense account does 
require that modes of presentation group together actual and pos-
sible cases of thinking about (or thinking as if about) a thing. It is 
not required that they be natural kinds of mental representation, 
16For an abnormal case in which this is not so, see my "I Falsely Believe 
that P," Analysis 52 (1992): 191. 
17For useful recent work on these questions, see Jennifer Saul, "The 
Pragmatics of Attitude Ascription," forthcoming. See also my Ta/,k About 
Beliefs (Cambridge: MIT, 1992), especially chapter 5, and "Notional Spec-
ificity." 
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nor that they be stably associated with natural language expres-
sions, nor that to engage in discourse about them one need to grasp 
them. 
For a given mode of presentation, it might be that knowing what 
it is (knowing what it is to employ it) is prior to one's capacity to 
participate in the kind of pretense that the pretense account de-
scribes. But, however natural that seems, it is not necessary. I am 
attracted to the view that our fundamental access to certain modes 
of presentation comes from our capacities to participate in pre-
tenses of just this kind. In such cases, we in the first instance have 
the capacity to understand what it takes to be, fictionally, thinking 
about this or that object, and only derivatively on this do we have 
any conception of the modes of presentation-of the requirements 
for its being fictionally true that someone is thinking of these ob-
jects.18 
5. Modal Content and Innocence 
So far we have explored a proposal restricted to the question of 
truth conditions; we have not decided what the pretense account 
should say about the modal contents expressed by attitude reports. 
In addition to having truth conditions, I will assume, utterances 
of sentences can express modal contents. My chief assumption 
about modal content is this: the modal content of an utterance 
answers the question, what must a possible situation be like for it 
to be accurately portrayed by this (actual) utterance? 19 In many 
semantic theories, utterances of sentences are said to express prop-
ositions, or portray states of affairs; these semantic values (accord-
ing to many such theories) determine the modal content of the 
utterance. 
18This is connected to certain suggestions Evans makes in his discussion 
of existence statements in Varieties of Reference (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1982). Relevant also is one way in which, according to Walton, met-
aphors can be essential; see "Metaphor and Prop Oriented Make-Believe." 
19 A conception of content built around this assumption is familiar from 
Kripke's Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). 
The theoretical centrality of such a notion of content (but not its semantic 
reality) is questioned by Michael Dummett in appendix 3 of The Interpre-
tation of Frege's Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), and 
by Evans in "Reference and Contingency," in Collected Papers (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1985). 
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So conceived, the modal content of an utterance and the utter-
ance's truth condition have to agree about the utterance's truth 
value (they have to "agree at the actual world"), but the truth 
condition of an utterance need not be equivalent to its modal con-
tent. For instance, an utterance of the sentence: 
(23) This utterance does not exist 
has an impossible truth condition (it cannot occur truly) but a 
contingently false modal content (the utterance correctly describes 
just those possible situations in which it does not exist). An utter-
ance's truth condition and its modal content are the answers to 
different questions. The truth condition answers the question, what 
must be so if this is to be a true utterance? The modal content 
answers the question, what must a possible situation be like for it 
to be accurately described by this (actual) utterance? The answers 
to these questions can come apart, sometimes dramatically. Indeed, 
shared truth value is the only necessary link. 20 A semantic account 
of truth conditions, then, seriously underdetermines an account of 
modal content. 
Now, 'it is open to us in developing the pretense account simply 
to identify the modal contents of attitude ascriptions with their 
truth conditions. However, this would be a mistake. To see why, 
let's return to the idea of semantic innocence-the idea that a 
name in an attitude report stands for just its ordinary referent. 
The pretense account as we have developed it thus far seems 
two-faced about semantic innocence. The account entails that a 
name in an ascription behaves completely innocently within the 
pretense; we pretend to relate the agent simply to the bearer of 
the name. But even if the name names a real thing, the ascription's 
truth condition is not a proposition that contains the thing as a 
constituent. This may appear to be a problematic loss of semantic 
innocence. Consider the argument from (24) and (25) to (26): 
20Given any two true sentences p and q, whatever their truth conditions 
and modal contents, we can construct (using the 'Actually' operator of 
philosophical logic) a sentence whose truth condition is necessarily equiv-
alent to that of p and yet whose modal content is necessarily equivalent to 
that of q, namely, 'Actually p, and if actually q then q'. And for any two 
false sentences p and q, the same feature is possessed by 'Actually p, or if 
not actually q then q'. 
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(24) Hammurabi believed that Hesperus is visible m the eve-
ning. 
(25) Hesperus is a planet. 
(26) So, there is a real thing such that Hammurabi had a belief 
attributing evening visibility to it. 
Surely this is a valid argument. One might worry that if the pre-
tense account were true, the inference would be invalid, since the 
truth condition of (24) would be a proposition not about Hesperus 
but about a mode of presentation-
(27) Hammurabi believed: [mu] is visible in the evening 
-which has no logjcal connection to the thing Hesperus itself. 
A first response to this worry is to observe that on the pretense 
account there indeed is an entailment here: so long as the premises 
are true, so is the conclusion. This is because the mode of presen-
tation that our make-believe concerns is always a mode of presen-
tation of the name's bearer, if it has one.21 Thus, if (24) is true, 
then Hammurabi's belief is about what our use of the name 'Hes-
perus' names, if anything. If (25) is true, then our use of the name 
'Hesperus' really does name something, and so the conclusion 
(26) must be true. 
But demonstrating a truth-conditional entailment may not be 
enough. There is an intuition that not only is there a truth-con-
ditional entailment, there is also an entailment in modal content: 
the modal contents of the premises necessitate the modal content 
of the conclusion. Any possible situation correctly described by the 
premises is correctly described by the conclusion as well. There is 
a natural line of reasoning that might lead one to doubt the en-
tailment in modal content. I will reject this line, but it will be useful 
to sketch it. The line starts with an argument that the modal con-
tent of (24) does not fly itself entail that of (26), because the ar-
21 This needs to be unpacked carefully if names are individuated in the 
ordinary way, such that different things can have the same name. We must 
understand the use of the name in the ascription as borrowing from one 
of one's personal traditions of univocally using the name to refer (one has 
different 'Aristotle' traditions for what one at least suspects might be dif-
ferent Aristotles). The mode of presentation in question must concern not 
just any bearer of the name, but what the name in fact names within that 
tradition. The source of this constraint will become clear later in the pres-
ent section. 
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gument from just (24) to (26) is relevantly like the clearly invalid 
argument from (28) to (29): 
(28) Elijah believes that Santa is overworked. 
(29) So, there is a real thing such that Elijah has a belief attrib-
uting overwork to it. 
So if there is an entailment in modal content from (24) and (25) 
to (26), the line goes, the premise (25) is indispensable. But if the 
modal content of (24) does not entail the modal content of (26) 
by i_tself, then it is absurd to suppose that it might do so when 
conjoined with the information that Venus is a planet (which is the 
modal content of (25)). For if (24) does not by itself entail (26), 
then it does not entail that Hammurabi has a belief about Venus. 
The modal content of (25) could be relevant to the entailment 
only if the modal content of (24) were itself about Venus; but if it 
were, surely premise (25) would not be required for the entail-
ment. So, while there is a logical entailment, one might well doubt 
that there is an entailment in modal content.22 
But I cannot accept this line of reasoning. If there is not an 
entailme.nt in modal content from (24) on its own to (26), it must 
be that there are possible situations in which Hammurabi believes 
that Hesperus is visible in the evening, but in which Hammurabi's 
belief is not about Venus. But how could that be? Might a belief 
correctly so described be about a different thing? Then we face 
the unattractive prospect that Hammurabi might believe, and be-
lieve truly, that Hesperus is visible in the evening, in a situation in 
which Hesperus is not visible in the evening. It seems hardly more 
palatable to admit a situation in which Hammurabi believes that 
Hesperus is visible in the evening, but in which his belief is about 
nothing whatever. This constitutes a strong case for the claim that 
in any situation in which Hammurabi believes that Hesperus is 
visible in the evening, his belief is about Venus-and so a strong 
22 1 should note the possibility of considering both premises to be 
framed from within the pretense. We can interpret (25) as meaning 'Hes-
perus is really a planet' (in analogy to 'Hesperus (really) exists'. As will be 
clearer after our discussion of existence and identity, this might give (25) 
the truth condition that the Hesperus-mode denotes a planet. If (25) is 
given this interpretation, there can be an entailment in modal content 
even if the modal content expressed by (24) has nothing essential to do 
with Venus. 
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case for the entailment in modal content from (24) on its own to 
(26). 
Fortunately, the pretense account can admit an entailment in 
modal content. Because of the gap between truth condition and 
modal content, and because the Hesperus-mode actually presents 
Venus, it is consistent with the pretense account that (24) expresses 
a modal content true of just those possible worlds in which Ham-
murabi attributes evening-visibility to Venus using the Hesperus-
mode (for if so, modal content and truth condition would agree 
as to truth value). Of course, it is one thing for a view to be co-
herent and another for it to be defensible. 
One way to defend it would be to hold that the Hesperus-mode 
denotes Venus essentially, so that it follows from Hammurabi's hav-
ing a belief employing it that the belief is about Venus. But I will 
set this possibility aside, since a far less contentious motivation is 
available. 
We need to answer the question, what possible situations are 
truly described by the utterance of (24)? If this question is capable 
of an answer, it must be possible to view the utterance not simply 
as determining a real-world condition for its actual fictional truth, 
but also as determining a condition that must be met by a possible 
world if the utterance is to be fictionally true in relation to that 
world. But what can it mean for an utterance to be fictionally true 
in relation to another really possible world? I suggest that we need 
the notion of genuine possibilities generating fictional possibilities. 
This notion is needed anyway, since even ordinary pretenses like 
our gods on the hill game extend modally. It is fictionally true that 
I might have pushed a god and made him fall, and this fact about 
fictional possibility is generated by the real possibility that I should 
have pushed you and made you fall. Just as real-world facts about 
the Hesperus-mode make it fictionally true that there are facts 
"about Hesperus," so certain genuine possibilities make it fiction-
ally true that there are certain sorts of possibilities "for Hesperus." 
The attitude report correctly describes just those possible worlds 
that generate fictional possibilities that, fictionally, are described 
truly by the utterance. 
The key question regarding semantic innocence, we can now 
see, is: which real possibilities generate fictional possibilities in 
which there are attitudes "about Hesperus" and "about Phospho-
rus"? The argument from (24) to (26) fails to exhibit an entail-
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ment in modal content if we answer this question in a particular 
way: by deciding that all possibilities in which there are attitudes 
involving the Hesperus-mode generate fictional possibilities involv-
ing attitudes "about Hesperus." If this is the right answer, then the 
possible worlds (if there are any) in which Hammurabi uses the 
Hesperus-mode to think not about Venus but about Mercury gen-
erate fictional possibilities in which Hammurabi is thinking "about 
Hesperus." But this clearly cannot be the right answer. Instead, the 
contours of our pretense seem normally to be such that only pos-
sibilities about attitudes that both involve the Hesperus-mode and 
are about Venus generate fictional possibilities concerning attitudes 
"about Hesperus." 23 Plausibly, this is a reflection within the pre-
tense of the rigidity of names.24 
If this is right, then (24) gives a true description only of possible 
situations in which Hammurabi's belief is about Venus, and so 
there is an entailment from that statement to (26). There is no 
similar entailment from (28) to (29) because the principles of gen-
eration that generate fictional thoughts (and fictionally possible 
thoughts) "about Santa" are not similarly tied to any real individ-
ual. Indeed, plausibly no genuine possibilities in which the Santa-
mode succeeds in denoting generate fictionally possible cases of 
thinking "about Santa" (another reflection within the pretense of 
the rigidity of names). 
These considerations suggest a general semantic account of at-
titude reports. The modal contents of attitude reports (typically) 
concern the real objects, if any, that the ascribed attitude allegedly 
concerns, as well as the required modes of presentation. For in-
stance, we can express the modal content of 'Hammurabi believes 
that Hesperus is brighter than Phosphorus' as follows: 
(30) Hammurabi believed: Venus[m11] is brighter than Ve-
nus[mp]. 
23If 'the Hesperus-mode' owes its nature to the contours of this pre-
tense, then it seems to follow that it is necessary that thoughts involving it 
concern Venus. 
24 Certain examples suggest that this principle of generation is defeasi-
ble: 'Had Hesperus not been Phosphorus, I would have believed that Hes-
perus was not Phosphorus'. Related examples are considered by Michael 
Dummett in Frege: Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1973), 113; Landman in Towards a Theory of Information, and Bezui-
denhout in "Pragmatics and Singular Reference." 
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That is, Hammurabi believed that Venus (thought of under the 
Hesperus-mode) is brighter than Venus (thought of under the 
Phosphorus-mode). This seems to me just the right account of 
modal content. It is not an unfamiliar account: Stephen Schiffer's 
"hidden indexical theory," John Perry's and my "unarticulated 
constituents" account, Mark Richard's "Russellian Annotated Ma-
trix" account, and Fran~ois Recanati's "quasi-singular proposition" 
account offer roughly the same story.2~ The key problem for this 
semantic account has been that despite its plausible verdicts con-
cerning which statements are true about which possible situations, 
the various developments of it have seemed ad hoc and false to 
the phenomenology of ordinary speech. The pretense account of-
fers a deep and phenomenologically plausible explanation for the 
semantics. Perhaps surprisingly, what grounds the semantics is not 
any technical riff from philosophical logic, but an understanding 
of indirectly serious discourse that has been made possible by Wal-
ton's work in aesthetics. 
6. Existence and Identity 
Now the promised return to identity. To set the stage, I will make 
two observations: one about a curious pattern in our talk about 
identity, the other about a prima facie difficulty for the pretense 
account of attitude reporting. 
Here, like it or not, is how we (and not only unjustly rebuked 
undergraduate metaphysicians!) talk about identity: 
( 31) When two things are identical, the one thing has the same 
properties as the other thing. 
As for the prima facie problem for the pretense account, consider: 
(32) Galileo knew that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
According to the pretense account, it is fictionally true that the 
names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' name two objects, and so the 
23Schiffer, "Naming and Knowing," in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2, 
ed. P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1977); Crimmins and Perry, ''The Prince and the Phone 
Booth," journal of Philosophy 86 (1989): 685-711; Crimmins, Talk About Be-
liefs; Richard, Propositional Attitudes (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990); Recanati, Direct Reference (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 
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speaker here fictionally claims that Galileo knew of two things that 
they are numerically identical. But no two things are identical, and 
so surely the statement is fictionally false, whatever Galileo believed. 
This would be a devastating problem for the pretense account, 
since surely (32) is relevantly like the other attitude reports we have 
considered, and in fact it is true. 
In addressing these issues, I will draw on an account due to 
Walton and Evans of statements attributing existence and nonex-
istence. The details of their presentations differ, but both hold that 
in saying 
(33) Santa does not exist 
one is pretending (or at least alluding to a pretense) that one can 
refer to a thing with a certain kind of use of the name 'Santa', in 
order to disavow such uses; one's statement is true just in case such 
uses do not refer. One very attractive feature of these accounts, as 
Walton and Evans emphasize, is that they capture the semantic 
phenomenology of such uses of empty names: they feel just like 
ordinary uses of referring names. This is respected by taking the 
use of the name, within the pretense, to be an ordinary use of a 
referring name. 
Walton suggests, somewhat tentatively, that in talking about what 
does and does not exist we might be engaging in a pretense to the 
effect that 'exists' expresses a discriminating property-a property 
that not everything has. This makes marvelous sense of a lot of 
puzzling talk about existence: 
(34) I've discovered that there are some things which don't re-
ally exist but which I had been duped into thinking exist. 
Among them are Santa, the tooth fairy, and Barney. 
This talk makes perfect sense if we view it as framed within a pre-
tense that there is a thing for every mode of presentation, except 
that some of these things do not have a certain property-one that 
we can refer to (within the pretense) as 'existence'. The things of 
which it is fictionally true that they have this property are exactly 
everything-everything in reality, that is. We pretend that there are 
more things than just those, but that everything else doesn't have 
this property. More precisely, while it is fictionally true of all modes 
of presentation that they denote things, it is fictionally true that a 
mode of presentation denotes a thing that has the property expressed 
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fly 'exists' just when that mode of presentation actually denotes a 
thing. When the speaker says 'There are some things that do not 
exist', I would say, she is relying both on the genuine universal 
property of existence (which informs 'There are') and the pre-
tended discriminating property (which informs 'do not exist'). 
Within the pretense, this might be described as the distinction be-
tween being and really existing. Of course, no such ontological dis-
tinction is seriously employed by the account, nor does the account 
attribute such an ontological distinction to us-our talk really con-
cerns only real things and real modes of presentation. 
The considerations about modal content in the previous section 
may suggest a contribution to this account. So far, I have sketched 
only an account of the truth conditions of statements about exis-
tence, as contrasted with their modal content. Evans does not dis-
cuss the modal content of these statements. Walton suggests that 
in a nonexistence statement "what one asserts is simply that to 
attempt to refer in a certain way is to fail." 26 But this is problematic. 
Consider: it does not seem that possible worlds in which the Santa-
mode de.notes someone normally are correctly described as worlds 
in which Santa exists. And it does not seem right that possible 
worlds in which Venus does not exist but in which the Hesperus-
mode denotes something other than Venus are normally correctly 
described as worlds in which Hesperus exists. Further, it does seem 
right to describe a world in which Venus exists as one in which 
Hesperus exists, even if no attempts to refer happen in it or in any 
nearby worlds. Probably these observations do not constitute a 
knock-down argument. But it seems to me that our attention is 
misdirected if, in assessing whether a statement like (33) correctly 
describes a possible situation, we focus on (potential) attempted 
acts of reference in that situation. It seems to me that the critical 
question must be what an attempted reference from here picks out 
there. More precisely, we need to ask which real possibilities make 
it fictionally true that there are possibilities in which "Santa exists." 
I believe that the following ideas are defensible: normally, (a) no 
possible world makes it fictionally true that there is a possible world 
in which "Santa exists" (so that (33) normally expresses a neces-
26 Mimesis as Make-Believe, 426. He also considers the possibility that one 
seriously asserts that it is fictionally true that one speaks truly in making 
the statement. 
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sary content despite having a contingent truth condition), and (b) 
all and only possible worlds in which Venus exists make it fictionally 
true that there are possible worlds in which "Hesperus exists."27 It 
seems to me that this suggestion has the merit of construing the 
modal content of existence claims as ontological rather than meta-
representational: they are really about what things there are, and 
not about our referential access to things. 
In the case of identity, the observation about our odd identity-
talk and the difficulty for the pretense account about (32) cry out 
for a parallel explanation. In talking about identity we standardly 
talk as if we think that things can be identical to other things. We 
talk as if identity, which in fact is as celibate as a relation can be, 
is promiscuous. More precisely, we pretend that with certain of our 
linguistic devices that normally express identity, we can express a 
relation that can hold between distinct objects. It is fictionally true 
that this relation holds between two objects when these fictional 
objects result from pretending-apart a single object (as in the case 
of Hesperus and Phosphorus) .28 In our pretense, for instance, Hes-
perus and Phosphorus are two objects that fictionally bear to each 
other the pretended promiscuous identity-relation: the one thing 
is, fictionally, the "same as" the other thing. 
One pay-off for the pretense account about attitude ascription 
is that statements like (32) are accommodated neatly. Within the 
pretense, the speaker of (32) is claiming that Galileo knew of two 
things that they bear the promiscuous identity-relation to each oth-
er. And it is fictionally true that the two things named by 'Hes-
perus' and 'Phosphorus' do bear that relation to each other. The 
real-world requirement for the fictional truth of (32) is the (true) 
claim (35): 
( 35) Galileo knowledgeably believed: [mu] is [mp]. 
(This proposition entails that the two modes of presentation in fact 
co-denote.) And, using our general apparatus, we see that the se-
rious modal content of the statement is equivalent to: 
27 However, as noted earlier, such constraints may be defeasible, offering 
resources to explain such sentences as 'Had Santa existed, I would have 
gotten more toys' and 'Had Hesperus not been Phosphorus .. .'. 
28We might allow that there are other ways for it to become fictionally 
true that this relation holds, to allow, for instance, for the fictional truth 
of 'Zeus is Jupiter'. 
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(36) Galileo knowledgeably believed: Venus[ mu] is Venus[ mp]. 
What of identity claims themselves? 
Frege's account, remember, allows even informative and true 
identity claims simply to attribute the relation of strict identity be-
tween the referents of referring expressions. The distinction be-
tween the two sides of the equation that explains the substantial 
nature of the statements is simply the difference in the modes of 
presentation tied to the terms. This seems to me a satisfying ex-
planation both of the truth conditions of these claims and of their 
substantiality. Frege did not address the question of modal content, 
but I believe that there is also a satisfying account of modal content 
open to him, namely Kripke's: identity claims (at least those in 
which the singular terms are referring devices and indeed refer) 
have necessary or impossible contents, depending on whether they 
are in fact true. That Frege's account of truth conditions coheres 
with Kripke's account of modal content is another manifestation 
of the gap between truth conditions and modal content. 
I am happy to allow that Frege's explanation of identity state-
ments is· often exactly right. But it does not offer a fully satisfying 
explanation of certain identity statements, in particular, those of 
which Russell's phenomenological confession rings most true: it 
feels as though we are saying of one thing that it is the same thing 
as another thing. In these cases, the pretense account offers a prom-
ising alternative picture. Consider, as framed within our running 
pretense, the statement: 
(37) Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
Suppose that for this statement to be true is for it to be fictionally 
true. For it to be fictionally true is for it to be fictionally true that 
the two objects denoted by these names stand in the pretended 
promiscuous identity relation. For that to be fictionally true is for 
it (really) to be the case that the object denoted by the Hesperus-
mode is the very object denoted by the Phosphorus-mode. Thus, 
the truth conditions offered by the pretense account are entirely 
Fregean. (Actually, that is only half true, since identity statements 
with nonreferring singular terms are deemed by the Fregean ac-
count not to possess truth values, whereas sometimes they are 
deemed false on the pretense account.~9 This offers accurate pre-
29This too is only approximately true, depending on how the contours 
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dictions; consider: 'He is Santa Claus'.) Furthermore, the Kripkean 
account of modal content open to Frege is open as well to the 
pretense account. The extra apparatus of the pretense account re-
tains approximately Fregean truth conditions and Kripkean modal 
content, but it supplies a satisfying explanation of Russell's phe-
nomenological observation-one, moreover, that coheres with an 
enhanced understanding of how we ascribe modes of presentation 
in reporting thought and talk. 
7. Appendix 
We will run through a number of examples and issues to exercise 
the pretense account. 
7.1 Speakers Mistaken About Identities 
Here is a potential problem. Suppose the speaker of 
(11) Hammurabi believed that Hesperus was brighter than 
Phosphorus 
herself believes that the two names name different objects. Surely, 
one might object, she is not making believe that the names name 
different objects, and yet the report means just what it means in 
our mouths-so the pretense account does not seem to apply cor-
rectly. 30 
Recall our distinction between what is expressly made believe 
and what is fictionally true. Fictional truths that are not themselves 
expressly made believe are generated from what is made believe 
with help from reality. In the statement 
(3) Ann is as clever as Holmes and more modest than Watson 
we do not make believe that Ann really is so related to individuals 
bearing those names. Whether this statement is fictionally true de-
pends on Ann's actual cleverness and modesty. It may in fact be 
fictionally true, and we may believe that it is fictionally true, but 
of the pretended promiscuous "identity" relation are to be spelled out. In 
particular, we might well allow 'Santa is Santa' and 'Zeus is Jupiter' to be 
counted true-in the pretense, "identity" extends to "things that don't 
exist." 
30Steve Yablo first called such examples to my attention. 
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even if so it is not something we are expressly making believe to be 
true, since it could be fictionally false consistently with everything 
we are making believe. While it may be only in odd cases that some-
one is mistaken about what she is expressly making believe, it is quite 
common to be mistaken about what is fictionally true; we might well 
be mistaken about whether (3) is fictionally true. 
The pretense account requires that for each of the two modes 
of presentation ascribed in ( 11), real facts about attitudes involving 
that mode of presentation generate fictional truths (fictionally) 
about a distinctive object. It is not entailed by this that the speaker 
must make believe that there are two objects, for she might assume 
that the two required objects are supplied by reality. Recall that we 
took the speaker of 
(18) Buchanan thinks that Gingrich is a communist 
to be making believe of a certain mode of presentation that it is the 
way to think of Gingrich. For the same reasons, it is plausible to 
take the speaker of ( 11) to be making believe, of the two modes of 
presentation, that each is the only way to think of the thing thus 
thought of. Since the modes of presentation in fact denote just one 
object, in fact her make-believe generates a certain merely fictional 
truth-a claim that is fictionally true and not really true-namely, 
the claim that the modes of presentation denote two objects. The 
speaker of ( 11) knows that it is fictionally true that the modes of 
presentation denote two objects. But since she is unaware that Hes-
perus is Phosphorus, she thinks that the reason that it is fictionally 
true that there are two objects so denoted is that it is true that there 
are two objects so denoted. She thinks something is genuinely true 
(and only derivatively fictionally true) when really it is merely fic-
tionally true. She rightly assumes that it is correct to talk as if there 
are two objects, but she is mistaken about why it is correct to talk 
that way. The response to the objection, then, is that, true, the claim 
that there are two objects rather than one is not something she is 
making believe; nonetheless, this is something that is fictionally true 
for her, and that is all that is entailed by the pretense account. This 
is a case of resolute fictional truth, in which a believed proposition 
counts as fictionally true even if the belief is false. 31 
31 In a reenactment of Waterloo, one might believe that it is in fact 
Napoleon's sword in one's hand, and yet the fictional truth of this claim 
would not depend on its truth. 
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7.2 Intentional Identity 
Consider Geach's example of what he calls intentional identity: 3~ 
(38) Hob thinks a witch has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob won-
ders whether she killed Cob's sow. 
Let us assume that the speaker and hearers do not believe in witch-
es, and assume that no person has harmed the mare and sow. 
This sentence might admit of importantly different readings. 
Perhaps on one reading (which is promoted if one inserts 'in ad-
dition' after 'Nob'), it is asserted that Hob believes the claim that 
exactly one witch blighted Bob's mare, Nob is said to believe that 
too, and to wonder whether it is true that there is just one witch 
who blighted Bob's mare, who also killed Cob's sow. Let us call 
this the in-addition reading. It can be explained by taking there to 
be a tacit claim that Nob too believes that a witch has blighted 
Bob's mare, and by taking 'she' to be, in Geach's terminology, a 
pronoun of laziness for the description 'the witch who has blighted 
Bob's mare' (and the description can be treated in Russell's way, 
with narrow scope): 
(39) Hob thinks that just one witch has blighted Bob's mare, 
Nob thinks that just one witch has blighted Bob's mare, 
and Nob wonders whether there is someone who is the one 
witch who has blighted Bob's mare and who killed Cob's 
sow. 
There is also a reading that involves something more aptly called 
intentional identity (and it is this reading that Geach has in mind). 
This reading is promoted if one replaces 'a witch' with 'a certain 
witch', and replaces 'she' with 'that witch'. It is difficult to explain 
this reading without portraying the statement as entailing that there 
is a witch. For now let us yield to this difficulty, and paraphrase the 
reading in question as: 
32
"Intentional Identity" and "The Perils of Pauline," in Logic Matters 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). In thinking about inten-
tional identity I have profited from Edelberg's "A New Puzzle about Inten-
tional Identity," Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (1986): 1-25, "Intentional 
Identity and the Attitudes," and "A Perspectivalist Semantics for the Atti-
tudes," as well as Michael McKinsey's "Mental Anaphora," Synthese 66 
(1986): 159-75. 
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( 40) A certain witch is such that Hob thinks that she has blight-
ed Bob's mare, and Nob wonders whether she killed Cob's 
sow. 
This reading tends to be dismissed by the sober; after all, it is 
stipulated that the speaker does not believe in witches. But that 
may be to take the statement too seriously. In a pretense in which 
a mode of presentation generates fictional facts about a distinctive 
object, it might well be that attitudes involving a certain mode of 
presentation make it fictionally true that there are attitudes about 
a certain witch (a witch who fictionally does not "exist," supposing 
the mode of presentation fails to refer). Let us call such a mode 
of presentation a "witch-generating" one. On the pretense ac-
count, the statement is fictionally true just if it is fictionally true 
that there is a witch, about whom Hob and Nob have such-and-
such beliefs. Hence, the real-world requirement for fictional truth, 
and also the truth condition of the serious statement, would be 
this: 
( 41) There is a witch-generating mode of presentation m such 
that Hob believes: [ m] has blighted Bob's mare, and Nob 
wonders whether: [m] killed Cob's sow. 33 
Let us call this the fictional-object reading of ( 38). Notice that it 
does not require that Nob share Hob's belief. This is appropriate, 
for (as Geach points out) statement (38) might be correctly used 
in the following sort of case: the community is agreed that there 
is a witch that has been damaging livestock; Hob says 'That witch 
has blighted Bob's mare' and Nob says (elsewhere at the same 
time) 'That witch may have killed Cob's sow'. 
It is possible, too, that there is a reading that combines the in-
addition reading with the fictional-object reading, in the obvious 
way (adjust (41) by requiring Nob to have the same belief that 
Hob is said to have). 
A related phenomenon also is nicely described by Geach:34 
Although I see no reason to doubt that: 
33This need not entail, as we would put it colloquially, that Nob assumes 
that the witch exists; it does plausibly entail that he does not assume that 
she does not exist. This seems right: we can unproblematically append to 
(38) 'but is unsure whether she even exists'. 
34
"Intentional Identity," 151 (sentence labels altered). 
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(42) The witch who blighted Bob's mare killed Cob's sow 
is analyzable as: 
( 43) Just one witch blighted Bob's mare and she killed Cob's sow 
it seems doubtful whether these two are mutually replaceable salva 
veritate in a context like "Nob wonders whether". If we prefix 'Nob 
wonders whether' to ( 42), the result seems to be analyzable, not as: 
(44) Nob wonders whether (the following is the case): just one 
witch blighted Bob's mare and she killed Cob's sow 
but rather in some such way as this: 
(45) Nob assumes that just one witch blighted Bob's mare, and Nob 
wonders whether she (that same witch) killed Cob's sow."~ 
The pretense account might offer an explanation as follows. The 
use in 
( 46) Nob wonders whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare 
killed Cob's sow 
of the description 'the witch who blighted Bob's mare' is, pretend-
edly, a wide-scoped description-a specification of the thing Nob's 
wonder is said to be about-which means that really it serves to 
specify the mode of presentation that Nob's wonder is said to in-
volve. This allows, correctly, that ( 46) need not imply that Nob 
really assumes that there is such a witch (the ascribed wonder 
seems consistent with serious doubts on that issue). It explains, too, 
why it is admissible to add 'of course, that witch doesn't exist'. And 
it explains why Geach's strategy of paraphrase will not work for: 
(47) Nob wonders whether the witch who blighted Bob's mare 
exists. 
Another very perplexing puzzle about intentional identity is due 
to Walter Edelberg.30 On natural readings, neither of ( 48) and ( 49) 
entails the other: 
( 48) Arsky thinks someone murdered Smith, and Barsky thinks 
he murdered Jones. 
35 As Geach notes, the example is not completely compelling. A better 
case (McKinsey's) is: Nob wishes that he caught the fish that got away 
(where the speaker doubts there really is such a fish). 
36
"A New Puzzle about Intentional Identity." 
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( 49) Barsky thinks someone murdered Jones, and Arsky thinks 
he murdered Smith. 
Now, the in-addition readings of these statements do not entail one 
another. So we are home free if the in-addition readings are in 
question. But the most puzzling version of this case defeats those 
readings. Suppose the circumstances known to the speaker and 
hearer are as follows: No one really has murdered or even has 
wounded Smith or Jones, but both have suffered serious wounds. 
Barsky and Arsky are aware of these wounds. Barsky has no sus-
pects, but he believes that just one person wounded both men, 
and he believes that Jones, but not Smith, has died from his 
wounds. Arsky has no suspects, he does not believe that just one 
person wounded both men, and he believes that Smith, but not 
Jones, has died from his wounds. In these circumstances, Edelberg 
holds, there are natural readings on which ( 48) seems true and 
(49) seems false. 
I am not sure he is right about this; our ability to interpret these 
statements in the described circumstances may involve some non-
trivial charitable creative reinterpretation. But let's assume that 
there are the needed readings, and explore what they might be. 
The circumstances block in-addition readings, because Barsky does 
not believe that Smith has been murdered and Arsky does not 
believe that Jones has been murdered. Fictional-object readings 
may be possible, however. Here is a try at expressing such readings: 
(50) The one Arsky thinks murdered Smith, Barsky thinks mur-
dered Jones. 
(51) The one Barsky thinks murdered Jones, Arsky thinks mur-
dered Smith. 
Now, these seem to me on the right track: to whatever extent ( 48) 
and ( 49) have the readings that Edelberg needs, so do (50) and 
( 51). One apparent difficulty with these readings is that these sen-
tences seem to entail that Arsky and Barsky have particular suspects 
in the attacks. But really all that is required by the fictional object 
treatment is that they have modes of presentation of the attackers 
(as in the circumstances plausibly they do) that fictionally generate 
objects of thought (as again is plausible). If you can get yourself 
in the frame of mind wherein (50) sounds true of the described 
situation, ask yourself: who is it that Arsky thinks murdered Smith 
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and that Barsky thinks murdered Jones. I think the answer will be: 
Smith's attacker. Plausibly, then, it is fictionally true that there is an 
object denotable as 'Smith's attacker', who makes (50) true. Now 
ask yourself, in that same frame of mind, but now focusing on the 
false-seeming (51), who is it that Barsky thinks murdered Jones 
(and that Arsky doesn't think murdered Smith)? I think the answer 
will be: Jones's attacker. What plausibly is going on, then, is this: 
fictionally there are two individuals, denotable as 'Smith's attacker' 
and 'Jones's attacker'; it is fictionally true that Barsky believes both 
that these individuals are identical and that since Jones's attacker 
murdered Jones, so did Smith's attacker; nonetheless, when we say 
'the one whom Barsky thinks murdered Jones', it is fictionally 
Jones's attacker rather than Smith's attacker that is denoted-per-
haps because, while he thinks that Smith's attacker is guilty of the 
same murder, it is only guilt by association ("identity"!) with the 
primary suspect (Jones' s attacker). 
7.3 Embedded Ascriptions 
Consider: 
(52) Sarah believes that Ray suspects that Laurie is pregnant. 
Applying the pretense account, we face a new issue: what does it 
take for it to be fictionally true that a given object of thought (in 
this case, Laurie) is being ascribed by one person (Sarah) as the 
object of another person's (Ray's) attitudes? The pretense account 
has it that for Ray's suspicion fictionally to be about Laurie, it must 
involve a certain mode of presentation, call it mL. For Sarah's belief 
fictionally to attribute to Ray a suspicion about Laurie, then, should 
require Sarah really to have a belief whose truth requires Ray to 
think of Laurie using mL. 
Now, here we face a rather abstruse complication. For the truth 
of Sarah's belief to turn on a fact about mL (namely the question 
whether Ray has a suspicion involving it) does not rule out that 
she has a very odd, irrelevant way of thinking about mL itself-
perhaps one she would be likely to acquire only in a philosophy 
class devoted to the alleged Fregean hierarchy problems. But surely 
that possibility is ruled out by (52)-the statement, then, is second-
order notionally loaded; it entails that Sarah has a certain kind of 
grasp on the way she takes Ray to think of Laurie. To capture this, 
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it is plausible to hold that Sarah counts fictionally as ascribing an 
attitude about Laurie just if she really has the proper grasp on the 
mode of presentation required for an attitude fictionally to be 
about Laurie. The truth condition of (52) might be represented 
in this way: 
(53) Sarah believes: [ %] suspects: [ [ 172inL]] is pregnant. 
The double brackets, I stipulate (and it really is an additional stip-
ulation about the notation), indicate that the mode of presentation 
specified within is, according to this proposition, Sarah's second-
order mode of presentation-that is, her mode of presentation of 
the mode of presentation of Laurie that she attributes to Ray. This 
likely seems complicated, but in my view the "output" is just what 
we should hope for: (52) is treated as a notionally loaded ascription 
of a notionally loaded ascription of an attitude.37 
7.4 Anaphora and De Se Reports 
Consider: 
(54) When Fred came in, Doris doubted that he was Fred. 
This notionally loaded ascription seems to present the following 
difficulty for the pretense account: If the account applies to it, then 
in the statement it must be fictionally true that the uses of 'he' 
and of 'Fred' in the complement clause refer to two objects. How-
ever, the use of 'he' is anaphoric on the earlier use of 'Fred', so 
surely it is not fictionally true that the use of 'he' refers to anything 
but what the use of 'Fred' refers to. 
The analogous example (55) is if anything even more trouble-
some: 
(55) Sometimes, when I see an important philosopher, I don't 
realize that she is that philosopher [or: that she is she]. 
The pretense account would predict that by the time we get to the 
complement clause, it is fictionally true that 'she' and 'that philos-
37 1 continue to find persuasive the argument in Talk About Beliefs (193-
94) for the claim that modes of presentation of modes of presentation are 
ascribed in embedded reports. The hierarchy has no end, but this is not 
a problem: thought is nowhere bare. 
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op her' (or the second 'she') refer to two things (and no doubt that 
these things are 'identical'). But each of these two expressions 
seems to be anaphoric on 'an important philosopher'. 
One response is that while anaphora requires co-reference, co-
reference in the context of the sort of pretense we are exploring 
is just a bit liberal: expressions co-refer only when they refer to 
things that are identical, but remember that it can be fictionally 
true that two things are identical. The response, then, is that the 
anaphoric connections in these examples are consistent with its 
being fictionally true that the expressions in the complement 
clauses refer to two things. In each case, that is, it is clear that the 
speaker is pretending that there are two "numerically identical" 
things, and it is clear to which of them the various names and 
pronominal phrases refer. 3H 
A different response to the problem about (54) would be to treat 
some of the pronominal phrases here as "lazy for" descriptions 
(such as 'the person who came in'). In spelling out this response, 
there is a decision to be made about the scope of these descrip-
tions. If they take narrow scope with respect to the attitude verbs 
(if they are descriptions that the agents allegedly would use), then, 
38 A possible reason for discomfort with this response is that it seems to 
predict that (56) would be an apt surrogate for (54), when really it is at 
best awkward: 
(56) ? When Fred came in, Doris doubted that he was the same person 
as Fred. 
In contrast, (57) does seem an apt surrogate: 
(57) When someone who in fact was Fred came in, Doris doubted that 
he was the same person as Fred. 
This is prima facie evidence that the response is not on the right track, 
since if (56) did involve the predicted sort of pretense, as (57) clearly does, 
surely it would be no more awkward than (57). 
On the other hand, perhaps (56) is not really so very awkward, and 
perhaps the awkwardness it has can be explained consistently with taking 
it to be semantically equivalent to (54). For instance, it might be that the 
crucial difference between (54) and (56) is a garden-path phenomenon-
that it owes to a cognitive effect of the increased "parsing distance" be-
tween 'he' and 'Fred'. The hearer discovers that she must, so to speak, 
pretend-apart Fred only when she encounters the second occurrence of 
'Fred'. In (56), perhaps, this realization is more surprising, since it comes 
only after the hearer has been lulled into being unprepared for it. So it 
seems that this response can be defended. 
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for instance, the claim made in (54) is just the claim that would 
be made in (58): 
(58) When Fred came in, Doris doubted that the person who 
came in was Fred. 
But this does not require, what should be required, that Doris be 
said to have a doubt that a certain person is Fred. If the descriptions 
take wide scope (if they are descriptions that the speakers are using 
to.- describe things), then the pretense account enters into the re-
sponse more centrally: in statement (54), that is to say, it would be 
fictionally true that the speaker's tacit use of 'the person who came 
in' denotes a thing thinkable only in a certain way. Statement (54) 
would express, within the pretense, what is expressed in (59): 
(59) When Fred came in, the person who came in was such that 
Doris doubted that he was Fred. 
Similar considerations apply to "de se" cases. Suppose that Lin-
gens has amnesia and is lost in a library,39 and that you are reading 
on a co'mputer screen a report of his progress. The report presents 
evidence that the lost man is, unbeknownst to himself, Lingens. 
You say: 
(60) That man doesn't think that he is Lingens. 
(61) I think that he is Lingens. 
The explanation of (60) is that you are pretending-apart Lingens 
into two people, and (pretendedly) claiming that the man doesn't 
believe that these two people ("he" and Lingens) are identical. 
For that man fictionally to have a belief about the first of these two 
people, the belief must involve a certain mode of presentation (call 
it m1), which is such that the man thinks of someone that way when 
he thinks of them first-personally. For him fictionally to have a 
belief about the second person, his belief must involve a certain 
mode of presentation (call it m2) which requires thinking of Lin-
gens as being called "Lingens." In (61), similarly, the speaker is 
pretending apart "he" and Lingens, and (pretendedly) claiming 
that he believes that the two are identical. The two fictional indi-
39See John Perry, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical," in The Prol>-
/,em of the Essential Indexical (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
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viduals again correspond to two ascribed modes of presentation mci 
(corresponding to 'he') and m4 (corresponding to 'Lingens'). 
Plausibly, m2 and m4 are the same mode of presentation. What 
about m1 and mci? Using m1 requires of Lingens that he think of 
himself first-personally, while using mci requires of you that you 
think of Lingens as "that man in the report." Now, this is not 
obviously incompatible with m1 and mci being the same mode of 
presentation. Remember that we are not assuming that modes of 
presentation reflect cognitive similarities between the agents who 
employ them; here we are taking them to be simply whatever clas-
sification of thoughts we in fact make in notionally loaded attitude 
reports. For the pretense account, the question of the identity of 
m1 and mci amounts to the question of the fictional identity of the 
individuals ("he" and "he") that the reports fictionally concern. 
Is it fictional that you have claimed of just one person both that 
you believe him to be Lingens and that Lingens does not? I am 
not sure, but suppose that you send an electronic message to Lin-
gens's terminal in the library: 
(62) Unlike you, I think that you are Lingens. 
Here, surely, the pretense account sees a single fictional individual 
being used to ascribe a first-personal belief to Lingens and a "that 
man in the report" belief to you. We might say that an interper-
sonally heterogeneous mode of presentation is ascribed. This is 
perfectly coherent, and thus we have seen how (60), (61), and (62) 
can all be true. 
Exercise for the reader: explore the consequences for this ac-
count of (62) of your receiving the error message, 'User cannot 
send message to own terminal'. 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor 
47 
